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AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY
LUKE MEIER* AND RORY RYAN**
THIS Article proposes a new concept—“aggregate alienability”—as alens by which to understand the complicated law regarding the valid-
ity of privately-imposed restraints on the alienability of real property.
Modern scholars have tended to explain this law—which sometimes invali-
dates restraints and sometimes upholds and enforces restraints—as simply
a “naked preference.”  In those instances in which the restraint is upheld
and enforced, the law is said to prefer the alienation rights of the grantor
(the party imposing the restraint).  When the restraint is stricken, the law
is said to prefer the alienation rights of the grantee (the party on whom
the restraint is imposed).  This Article rejects the notion that the nuanced
law regarding the validity of restraints on alienability is best explained as
simply a naked preference in favor of some parties over others.  Instead,
this Article argues that the rules regarding the validity of restraints on
alienation are actually based on a rough prediction as to how to maximize
property alienability.  In some instances, maximum alienability is best
achieved by invalidating the attempted alienability restraint.  In other in-
stances, however (and somewhat counter-intuitively), maximum alienabil-
ity is best achieved by upholding and enforcing an alienability restraint.  In
either instance, the legal rules about the validity of a particular restraint
are not a preference for either the grantor or the grantee, but an attempt
to maximize efficiency by facilitating the alienation of property.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal concept of private property is fundamental to the workings
of a capitalist market.1  In a capitalist system, decisions regarding resource
allocation are primarily made at the individual level.2  Government creates
* Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.
** Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.
1. See AYN RAND WITH NATHANIEL BRANDEN, ALAN GREENSPAN & ROBERT HES-
SEN, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 19 (New Am. Library 2d ed. 1967) (“Capital-
ism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including
property rights, in which all property is privately owned.”); Paul H. Rubin & Til-
man Klumpp, Property Rights and Capitalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAPITAL-
ISM 204, 204 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 2012) (“Property rights are a necessary but
not sufficient condition for capitalism.”).
2. See GARY WOLFRAM, A CAPITALIST MANIFESTO: UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET
ECONOMY AND DEFENDING LIBERTY 1 (2012) (“The genius of capitalism is that it
is . . . a fluid system with millions of individual exchanges, resulting in the most
efficient allocation of resources.”); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREE-
DOM 15 (1962) (“[A] major source of objection to a free economy is precisely that
it . . . .  gives people what they want instead of what a particular group thinks they
ought to want.”); LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL
(1013)
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and enforces entitlements to “property,” which allows individual users to
decide what to do with “their” property.3  By enforcing private agreements
to trade these rights, resources flow to the party in the best position to do
something beneficial with that resource.  This result is in society’s interest
as a whole.4  Indeed, one of the “sticks” in the “bundle of rights” associ-
ated with property is the right to alienate that property according to the
user’s perception of what is in his best interest.5
In order for this flow to the “best” user to occur, the resource must
remain free of legal impediments to transfer.  As such, the common law
has generally strived to keep property freely alienable, particularly real
property.6  In some instances, such as with the rule against perpetuities,
common law rules have developed to deal with private decisions that
might indirectly inhibit the transfer of real property.7
The most obvious example of the common law’s effort to keep prop-
erty alienable, though, is the set of rules invalidating attempts by individu-
ANALYSIS 537 (J. Kahane trans., Ludwig von Mises Inst. new ed. 2009) (1951) (“The
issue is always the same: the government or the market.  There is no third
solution.”).
3. See Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555,
560 (1991) (“The first mission of the legal system is to determine an initial set of
property rights from which subsequent bargains can go forward at reasonably low
cost. . . .  The third mission of the law is to facilitate the voluntary exchanges of
property rights—the law of contracts.”).
4. See II ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 419, 421 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (1776) (“Every individual
is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for
whatever capital he can command.  It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of
the society, which he has in view.  But the study of his own advantage naturally, or
rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advanta-
geous to the society. . . .  [H]e intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was not part
of his intention.”); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CON-
TEMPORARY APPROACH 322 (2d ed. 2012) (“Utilitarian theory holds that transfera-
bility is necessary to ensure the productive use of land.”); see also F. A. v. Hayek,
Scientism and the Study of Society (pt. 3), 11 ECONOMICA 27, 29–30 (1944) (“Many of
the greatest things man has achieved are not the result of consciously directed
thought, and still less the product of a deliberately co-ordinated effort of many
individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which he can
never fully understand.”).
5. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 80 (4th ed. 1998)
(describing “right to transfer” as stick in bundle of property rights).
6. See A. W. B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW
224 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986) (stating that common law has attempted to
preserve property alienability); Andrea J. Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation
Restraints and the Hazard of Unbounded Servitudes, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 450, 452 (2014)
(“Traditionally, the law has jealously guarded the right to transfer real property,
striking down deed alienation restraints . . . .”).
7. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COM-
PARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 184 (1998) (“The Rule Against Perpetuities is
a means to prevent, or limit, ‘indirect’ restraints on alienation.”).
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als8 to directly restrain the alienability of real property.9  When A transfers
Blackacre to B while attempting to withhold (or inhibit) B’s ability to sub-
sequently transfer Blackacre, A has directly restrained the alienability of
Blackacre.  This restraint on B’s ability to transfer Blackacre seems to di-
rectly contradict the general goal of keeping property free from restric-
tions on transfer.  As such, one might expect the common law to flatly
prohibit A from imposing any restraints on B’s ability to transfer Blackacre.
As any first-year law student knows, however, the common law does
not indiscriminately invalidate all privately imposed alienability restraints.
Instead, the law regarding the validity of privately imposed alienability re-
straints is incredibly nuanced.10  For instance, restraints imposed upon fee
simple estates are usually invalid,11 while restraints on a tenant’s ability to
transfer a leasehold are almost always upheld and enforced.12  In some
instances, the “black letter law” consists of nothing more than a “rule of
thumb”: restraints imposed in a donative transfer are more likely to be
judicially invalidated than restraints imposed as part of a non-donative,
arm’s-length transaction between grantor and grantee.13
8. At the outset, it is important to note that this Article deals only with pri-
vately imposed alienability restraints.  Some of the most influential recent com-
mentary regarding property alienation has focused on legal rules that operate to
prohibit the alienation of certain rights. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 984–85 (1985) (justifying legally im-
posed as opposed to privately imposed restraints on alienability in contexts such as
sale of voting rights); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 962–63 (1985).  The legality (and desirability) of
privately imposed restraints is a completely different topic than legally imposed
restraints on alienability; legally imposed restraints impede the market, while pri-
vately imposed restraints are a by-product of the market.
9. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES 532 (2007) (“The law has long favored transferability of property.  Nowhere is
this more clearly seen than in the common-law rule against restraints on
alienation.”).
10. See Michael D. Kirby, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Cen-
tury Doctrine in a 21st Century Perspective, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 413, 413 (1988) (“The
modern terminology which has developed for the classification of these ‘restraints
on alienation’ would appear to pigeonhole each attempted restraint, eliminating
all doubt as to what is a restraint and which restraints are valid.  However, as with
many common law concepts, different judges have given diverse opinions relating
to classification and validity, resulting in inconsistent application of already vague
rules of law.” (footnote omitted)).
11. See Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete”
Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 567 n.76 (1991) (“Absolute, explicit restraints
are everywhere held invalid when imposed on fee simple estates . . . .”).
12. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to
Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV. 751, 755
(1988) (“Historically, the common law courts, preferring form over function (as in
much of property law), have not viewed the lease as a freehold estate, and have
allowed absolute restrictions on the alienability of a lease.”).
13. See infra note 29.  Indeed, the most recent trend is to express the entire
body of law regarding the validity of alienation restraints in the form of an all-
encompassing balancing test. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4
(2000) (“A servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the burdened
3
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If A is sometimes allowed to transfer Blackacre to B while simultane-
ously prohibiting B’s ability to transfer Blackacre, an obvious question
arises: why?  Given the importance of property transfers to a market econ-
omy, and given the common law’s general effort to keep property aliena-
ble, why would A—at least in some instances—be allowed to directly
prohibit B from transferring Blackacre?
Efforts by legal scholars to answer this question have shifted over
time.  Under what can be labeled as the “initial view,” scholars tended to
conceive of the nuanced common law regarding the validity of alienability
restraints as a balance between the policy goal of free alienability and
other, competing policy interests.14  Because free alienability had to be
balanced against other policy interests, restraints on alienability would
sometimes be invalidated and sometimes be upheld.15  In certain circum-
stances (such as with a restraint on a fee simple estate), the goal of free
alienability was paramount and, consequently, the alienability restraint
would be invalidated.  In other instances, however (such as with a restraint
on a leasehold estate), the policy objective of free alienability was trumped
by countervailing policy goals,16 and the alienability restraint would there-
estate is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable.  Reasonableness is determined by
weighing the utility of the restraint against the injurious consequences of enforc-
ing the restraint.”).  The general consensus, however, is that the new balancing test
proposed in the Third Restatement is simply a different way of articulating this
complex body of law. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1410 (2013) (explaining that Third Restatement bal-
ancing test does not “displace” previous body of law).
14. See, e.g., Seagate Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (“The ancient rule against restraints on alienation is founded en-
tirely upon considerations of public policy, specifically, the idea that the free alien-
ability of property fosters economic and commercial development.  Competing
policy considerations, however, have, almost from the inception of the rule, caused
exceptions to be carved out of it.” (citations omitted)); Gregory S. Alexander, The
Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1223 (1985) (“The pre-Classicalists did not express the issue of regulation of alien-
ation in terms of a conflict between the will of the individual owner and that of the
state.  Nor was there any apparent recognition of indeterminacy in the notion of
freedom of alienation.  The logical contradiction in permitting freedom of disposi-
tion to both present and future property owners, requiring a choice between do-
nor and donee, was simply not recognized.”).
15. This perspective can still be seen in some modern scholarship. See, e.g.,
James J. Kelly, Jr., Homes Affordable for Good: Covenants and Ground Leases as Long-
Term Resale-Restriction Devices, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 25 (2009) (“[T]hese
common law standards [ ] strike a balance between alienability and competing
goals . . . .”); Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property
Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1525, 1549 (2007) (“Although the policy of freedom of contract would argue
for the enforcement of all consensual land allocation agreements, another major
policy—free alienability of real property—may require the abrogation of some
land contracts.”).
16. The articulation of these competing policy objectives is often somewhat
vague. See, e.g., Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermin-
ing Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales
of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 555 (2001) (“[T]he economic policy
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-DEC-15 12:21
2015] AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY 1017
fore be upheld and enforced by the courts.  Thus, the initial answer by
early scholars to the question posed in the previous paragraph (“Why does
the law sometimes permit A to restrain B’s ability to alienate Blackacre?”)
was that the goal of free alienability sometimes had to be subordinated to
different policy objectives.
This view has been rejected by most modern scholars.  Modern schol-
ars reject the starting assumption that the goal of free alienability is neces-
sarily advanced by invalidating an alienability restraint.  For modern
scholars, the goal of advancing alienability is more complicated than what
was contemplated under the initial view. 17  According to the modern
view, the problem with the initial view was that it considered the alienabil-
ity question only at the point in which B desired to transfer to a third party
(C) in violation of a previously imposed restraint.  From this limited van-
tage point, of course, alienability is enhanced if the restraint is stricken
and B is allowed to transfer to C.  For modern scholars, though, this ap-
proach to the issue is incomplete, and a more comprehensive perspective
is needed.  This perspective must consider the alienability question not
just at the point in time at which B desires a transfer to C, but also at the
point in which A initially transferred to B.18  The modern perspective is
best understood according to the timeline depicted below:
A-to-B B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)(A imposes restraint)
FIGURE A
While invalidating A’s restraint allows the B-to-C transaction to occur,
modern scholars have recognized that this decision inhibits A’s ability to
freely alienate his property as he sees fit (including by withholding the
right to alienate from B).  Modern scholars describe this as a paradox: a
decision to enforce the restraint obviously interferes with the grantee’s abil-
ity to alienate the property.  Invalidating the restraint, however, interferes
disfavoring restraints on alienation often collides with policies or practices that
support the social and economic interests of groups or political goals of civic
participation.”).
17. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 1189 (“Individual freedom to dispose of
consolidated bundles of rights cannot simultaneously be allowed and fully main-
tained.  If the donor of a property interest tries to restrict the donee’s freedom to
dispose of that interest, the legal system, in deciding whether to enforce or void
that restriction, must resolve whose freedom it will protect, that of the donor or
that of the donee.”).
18. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1199 (1999) (“Thus, it is rarely clear whether alienability refers to a current or
future owner’s freedom to dispose of undivided ownership.”).
5
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with the grantor’s alienation rights, whose ability to dispose of property as
he sees fit is impeded when a restraint clause is stricken.19
From this perspective, some modern scholars have reasoned that the
policy goal of keeping property alienable cannot explain the nuanced
common law as to when privately imposed restraints are valid or invalid
because a decision to either uphold or invalidate the restraints promotes
one party’s alienation rights.20  If the restraint is stricken, B is allowed to
transfer to C.  If the restraint is upheld and enforced, A’s alienation rights
are protected.  Under the modern perspective, then, the underlying policy
in this area of the law is not the promotion of alienability, but resolving
whose alienation rights should be preferred: the grantor’s (by upholding
the restraint) or the grantee’s (by invalidating the restraint).  Resolving
this problem is simply a “naked preference” in favor of either the grantor
or the grantee.21  Thus, the modern answer to the previously-posed ques-
tion is as follows: Party A is sometimes allowed to restrain Party B’s right to
alienate because sometimes the law prefers Party A over Party B.
This Article proposes a different perspective.  In some sense, the per-
spective advanced herein is consonant with the modern critique of the
initial view: we agree that a comprehensive account of alienability law must
consider the issue from the perspective of both the A-to-B transaction and
the B-to-C transaction.  This Article, however, rejects the notion that this
perspective compels the conclusion that the black-letter law is simply a
“naked preference” in favor of either grantors or grantees.  Instead, we
argue that the nuanced law of alienation restraints can be largely ex-
plained by the objective concept of “aggregate alienability.”  Aggregate
alienability posits that restraints are either valid or invalid based on a
rough sense by judges as to how to keep property as alienable as possi-
ble,22 considered from the perspective of both the grantor (who desires to
19. See, e.g., MERRELL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 532 (“This rule [against re-
straints on alienation], of course, limits the freedom of the original owner to trans-
fer: The original owner is barred from engaging in a transfer that limits further
transfers.”); see also EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY
LAW 257 (6th ed. 2011) (describing tension between proposition that property
owners should be able to sell their property as they see fit with notion that prop-
erty owners should be bound by commitment not to refrain from selling property).
20. See Richard R. Powell, Freedom of Alienation—For Whom? The Clash of Theo-
ries, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 127, 127 (1967) (discussing how law regarding
restraints on alienability pits alienation rights of grantor verses alienation rights of
grantee).
21. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 1193 (“[W]ithin the individualistic regime
of consolidated property there is no objective basis for choosing between the au-
tonomy of the donor and that of the donee . . . any resolution of that problem is a
‘naked preference.’”).
22. Some commentators have distinguished the term alienability from marketa-
bility, with alienability referring to the legal right of a party to sell a property interest
(or a fraction thereof) and marketability referring to the desirability of the property
interest on the open market. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 474 (1984)
(making this distinction).  Under this lexicon, our “aggregate alienability” concept
might be more appropriately labeled as aggregate marketability.  Although this Arti-
6
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alienate his property while simultaneously restraining the alienation rights
of the grantee) and the grantee (who desires to alienate in violation of the
previously imposed restraint).  The development of the black-letter law in
this area is not simply a series of naked preferences by judges in favor of
grantors or grantees, but rather a calculated effort to achieve a desired
result (maximum alienability) in a complex environment.  In our view,
then (and to answer the question posed above), the law sometimes per-
mits A to restrain B’s right to alienate because—counterintuitively—this
might actually enhance the aggregate alienability of the property involved.
Properly understanding the true basis of the nuanced law of restraints
on alienability, we believe, has profound consequences outside of the ivory
tower.  Every day, judges and lawyers struggle to apply the common law of
alienability restraints to new or unresolved issues.  Without a clear under-
standing of the theoretical basis of this body of law, lawyers and judges in
cases of first impression are often forced to resolve these questions in an
analytical vacuum, usually by strained analogies to accepted black-letter
rules.23  By understanding the true basis of the nuances within this body of
law, judges and lawyers can ask the “right” questions in resolving a particu-
lar dispute.  The objective of this Article is to provide an accurate theoreti-
cal understanding of the nuanced law of the validity of privately imposed
alienability restraints, so that future disputes in this area can be resolved
faithful to the policy goals which originally shaped this complex body of
law.
II. AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY EXPLAINED
This Section explains the concept of aggregate alienability.  This idea
assumes that a decision by courts to either enforce or invalidate a privately
imposed alienability restraint can have a net effect on the overall alienabil-
ity of property.  This Section will rely heavily on the timeline depiction
introduced in the previous section:
cle considers the legal rules that sometimes restrain a grantor’s alienation rights, we
posit that these rules are actually based on a rough sense of how those alienation
rules ultimately affect the actual marketability of the property in question.  We ulti-
mately, however, decided to use the more generic term aggregate alienability in this
Article.  This decision was based, in part, on the fact that some commentators have
employed the terms alienability and marketability to make entirely different analyti-
cal distinctions than the one described above. See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting
Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1427–28 (2009) (using alienability to refer to
legal prohibitions on property transfers and marketability to refer to legal conditions
that impede property transfers); Heller, supra note 18, at 1200 (“[A]lienability refers
to an individual’s freedom to fragment and transfer ownership today, while mar-
ketability refers to the rules that keep property available for future productive use
by limiting individual choice.”).  Also, we just like the phrase aggregate alienability
better than aggregate marketability.
23. We have experienced this phenomenon, first hand, in a case dealing with
the validity of restraints on alienation in an oil and gas lease.  Our involvement in
that case was the impetus for this Article.
7
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A-to-B B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)(A imposes restraint)
FIGURE B
In the A-to-B transaction, A grants property to B but restricts B’s abil-
ity to subsequently transfer that property.  In the B-to-C transaction, B
seeks to transfer the property to C in violation of the previously imposed
restraint.  As previously explained, a comprehensive approach to alienabil-
ity law requires that both of these transactions be considered.
At the point that B seeks to transfer to C in violation of the previously
imposed restraint (and assuming that the validity of this transfer is
presented to a court), 24 a court can either invalidate or uphold the legal-
ity of A’s restraint on B’s power of alienation.  This decision will obviously
affect the validity of the B-to-C transaction.  If the restraint is upheld, the
B-to-C transaction is legally precluded.  In this sense, then, the alienability
of the property has been restricted: a transaction that the market desires
(B-to-C) has been prevented.
On the other hand, a decision by a court to invalidate the alienability
restraint will have the effect of permitting the B-to-C transaction to occur.
From the perspective of keeping property alienable, this seems like a good
thing; the transaction that the market desires is not precluded by the
courts.  Here, however, it is important to consider what impact this deci-
sion might have on the A-to-B transaction.25  Of course, if we consider A to
be a specific party, a decision by a court at the point that B seeks to trans-
fer to C can have no effect on the A-to-B transaction; this transaction has
already occurred.  But if the A-to-B transaction is considered as a type of
transaction rather than a specific transaction, then it is clear that a court’s
decision to invalidate or uphold the alienability restraint can influence
whether A-to-B transactions even occur.  If parties like A know that their
desired restraint on B’s alienability will not be enforced, they might forgo
this transaction altogether.
A decision to either invalidate or uphold the alienability restraint,
then, has inverse effects on the respective A-to-B and B-to-C transactions.
Upholding the restraint precludes the B-to-C transaction, as well as all
transactions like B-to-C.  Invalidating the restraint allows the B-to-C transac-
tion (and all similar transactions) to proceed, but will likely inhibit parties
like A from engaging in future A-to-B transactions.  The figures below de-
pict this inverse relationship:
24. Cf. infra note 50.
25. Professor Fennell has labeled this type of analysis as an ex ante or “up-
stream” objection. See Fennell, supra note 22, at 1411–12 (distinguishing “up-
stream” objections to market transfer from “downstream” objections to market
transfer (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8
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A-to-B
(A imposes restraint)
B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)
FIGURE C (RESTRAINT UPHELD AND ENFORCED)
In Figure C, the restraint has been enforced.  The B-to-C transaction
is precluded, and this effect on market alienability is represented by the
“down” arrow.  The A-to-B transaction, however, can proceed, with parties
like A knowing that their desired alienability restraint will be enforced by
the courts.  This result is depicted by the “up” arrow.
In Figure D below, the restraint is invalidated, producing the opposite
effect on the respective transactions.  Because the restraint is unenforce-
able, the B-to-C transaction can proceed, as represented by the “up” arrow.
The A-to-B type of transaction will be inhibited, however, because parties
like A might choose to refrain from entering into the transaction if they
know that their desired restraint will not be enforced.  This result is de-
picted by the “down” arrow.
A-to-B
(A imposes restraint)
B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)
FIGURE D (RESTRAINT INVALIDATED)
As this relationship is depicted in Figures B and C, it is tempting to
conclude that a decision to either uphold or invalidate the alienability re-
straint will be a “wash” in terms of the overall effect on alienability.  Either
way, one type of transaction (A-to-B or B-to-C) will be prohibited (or chil-
led) and one type of transaction will be permitted.
The concept of aggregate alienability advanced herein, however,
states that a decision to either uphold or invalidate an alienability restraint
will not necessarily produce an exact inverse effect on transactions A-to-B
and B-to-C.  Thus, the “benefits” of invalidating the restraint (permitting
B-to-C transactions) might outweigh the “costs” (chilling the A-to-B trans-
9
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action).  Or, the benefits of upholding the restraint (no chilling on A-to-B
transactions) might outweigh the costs (precluding B-to-C transactions).
This idea is best explained by returning to the depictions used above.
Recall that a decision to invalidate an alienability restraint will permit
B-to-C transactions but will chill A-to-B transactions.  Under aggregate
alienability, however, the chilling of A-to-B transactions might be less pro-
nounced then the positive impact on B-to-C transactions.  This is depicted
in Figure E below.  In Figure E, invalidation of the alienability restraint has
some chilling effect on A-to-B transactions.  However, this effect is muted
because some (perhaps many) parties in the position of A will proceed
with the A-to-B transaction even though they know they cannot achieve
their desired result of restricting B’s power of alienation.  The diminished
“down” arrow under the A-to-B transaction represents this result.
A-to-B
(A imposes restraint)
B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)
FIGURE E (RESTRAINT INVALIDATED, MUTED EFFECT
ON A-TO-B TRANSACTION)
In Figure E, invalidating the alienability restraint achieves aggregate
alienability: B-to-C transactions can occur, and although some A-to-B trans-
actions are chilled, the net effect of this chilling is less than the B-to-C
transactions that are allowed.
Aggregate alienability can also work in the opposite (less counterin-
tuitive) direction.  Recall that a decision to uphold and enforce an aliena-
bility restraint precludes B-to-C transactions but has no chilling effect on
(and thus facilitates) A-to-B transactions.  Under aggregate alienability,
however, certain factors might mute the prohibitive effect on B-to-C trans-
actions that occurs from enforcing the alienability restraint.  This result is
depicted below in Figure F by the diminished down arrow under the B-to-
C transaction.
A-to-B B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)(A imposes restraint)
FIGURE F (RESTRAINT UPHELD AND ENFORCED, MUTED EFFECT ON B-TO-C)
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In this situation, net alienability is actually achieved by upholding the
restraint.  This facilitates A-to-B transactions, and although B-to-C transac-
tions are somewhat impaired, the net effect of this impairment is less than
the positive impact on A-to-B transactions.
The purely theoretical description of aggregate alienability in this
Section provides a basis for the discussion in the next Section.  In it, we
will apply the concept of aggregate alienability to the nuanced common
law rules that determine the validity of privately-imposed alienability re-
straints.  This application of aggregate alienability should help to clarify
the abstract discussion in this Section.
III. USING AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE LAW
OF ALIENATION RESTRAINTS
The common law has developed a complex body of rules to deter-
mine the validity of privately-imposed alienability restraints.  In this Sec-
tion, we show how the concept of aggregate alienability explains the major
rules in this body of law.  For the first two rules discussed in Sections III(A)
and (B), aggregate alienability turns on disparate effects within the trans-
action in which the restraint is imposed (what we have referred to as A-to-
B transactions).  For the last four rules discussed in Sections III(C)–(F),
aggregate alienability turns on the disparate effect that different types of
restraints have on subsequent transfers of the property interest in question
(what we have referred to as B-to-C transactions).
A. Donative Transfers v. Non-Donative Transactions
The first nuance of the law regarding the validity of alienability re-
straints concerns the distinction between “donative transfers” and “non-
donative transfers.”  A donative transfer is a conveyance in which the gran-
tor receives nothing in return for the transfer of his title.26  A non-dona-
tive transfer is a transaction in which the grantor receives some form of
consideration for his transfer of title.27  The distinction between donative
and non-donative transfers is generally recognized in the three Restate-
ments of the Law for Property.28  With regard to how this distinction af-
fects the validity of restraints on alienability, the Second Restatement
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS Intro. (1983)
(explaining difference between donative and non-donative transfers).
27. See id.
28. Both the Restatement (Second) of Property and the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty address donative transfers as a separate topic. See id. (explaining why donative
transfers were treated as separate topic); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS Intro. (2000) (same).  The distinction between
donative and non-donative transfers is also drawn in the initial Restatement, albeit
in a more subtle fashion. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 410 cmt. a (1944)
(distinguishing validity of restraint on alienation of lease when restraint is imposed
as part of “a business” transaction as opposed to another type of transaction such
as donative transfer).
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directly addresses the issue by indicating that restraints that are imposed
within the context of non-donative transfers will be treated more permis-
sively than restraints imposed within the context of a donative transfer.29
The rule is perhaps most easily understood by stating it inversely to how it
is articulated in the Restatement: alienation restraints are more likely to be
stricken when they are imposed within a donative transfer.
The concept of aggregate alienability explains why courts are more
likely to invalidate an alienation restraint imposed within a donative trans-
fer.  Because donative grantors are less likely (than non-donative grantors)
to be chilled by a rule that invalidates their desired restraint, courts are
more likely to invalidate a restraint in the donative context.
This idea is best understood by returning to the depictions that were
used in Section II to explain the concept of aggregate alienability.  Recall
that a court’s decision to invalidate an alienation restraint has inverse ef-
fects on two different types of transactions, as represented below:
29. The Restatement articulates this concept in a somewhat obtuse manner.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, pt. II, introductory
note (1983) (“[T]he rules developed in this Part [concerning donative transfers],
to the extent that they permit restraints on alienation, are equally permissive in
regard to non-donative transfers.”).  Despite the clumsiness of this language, how-
ever, the point that restraints on alienation are more likely to be valid in non-
donative transfers is relatively clear. See, e.g., Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug. Co., 884
S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (“In other words, if an alleged restraint on
alienation is valid under the Restatement provisions, it is valid whether the transac-
tion is donative or nondonative.  The important implication of the quoted
passages, however, is that the Restatement was not intended to address unreasonable
commercial restraints on alienation.  That is, an alleged restraint on alienation
could be invalid in a donative context, but nevertheless be valid in a nondonative
context.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1
cmt. d (1983) (“To the extent that a disabling restraint is found valid under [a
donative transfer], it should likewise be found valid in a non-donative transfer.”);
id. § 4.1, statutory note 10 (1983) (“Recent developments in cases concerned with
commercial transfers of property indicate that courts are increasingly willing to deal
with disabling restraints on their individual merits rather than invalidating them
wholesale, and will uphold such restraints if they leave available a means of current
transfer and if under all the circumstances the legal policy favoring freedom of
alienation does not reasonably apply.” (emphasis added)).  In addition, although
the First and Third Restatements are less explicit in distinguishing between dona-
tive and non-donative transfers in their respective discussion of restraints on alien-
ation, the analysis adopted in these Restatements nevertheless incorporates this
distinction and confirms that the law is more permissive with regard to restraints
on alienability for non-donative transfers. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 410
cmt. a (1944) (stating that restraint imposed as part of “business” transaction is
more likely to be valid as opposed to when restraint is imposed as part of donative
transfer); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (2000) (ex-
plaining that validity of restraints imposed within  donative transfer is not sepa-
rately addressed in Third Restatement “because they are extensively treated in [the
Second Restatement]”); cf. id. §3.5 cmt. b (explaining that indirect restraints on
alienation are more likely to be upheld when restraints are imposed in commercial
transaction as opposed to donative transfer).
12
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A-to-B B-to-C
(A imposes restraint) (B seeks to avoid restraint)
FIGURE G (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
When a court decides to invalidate the alienation restraint (in the B-
to-C transaction before the court), this permits the B-to-C transaction (and
all similar transactions) to occur.  This effect is represented by the “up”
arrow in Figure G.  The decision to strike the alienation restraint, how-
ever, will have some chilling effect on A-to-B transactions.  If grantors in
the position of A know that their desired alienation restraint will not be
enforced, they might be dissuaded from entering into the A-to-B transac-
tion in the first place.  This effect is represented by the “down” arrow
under the A-to-B transaction.
The chilling effect on A-to-B transactions is different when A-to-B in-
volves a donative transfer rather than a non-donative transfer.  For reasons
explained below, striking down a restraint imposed within a donative
transfer is going to have less of a chilling effect on future donative trans-
fers than is striking down a restraint imposed within a non-donative trans-
fer.  Before proceeding to this explanation, this somewhat tricky notion is
depicted in the two charts below.
A-to-B B-to-C
(Non-Donative Transfer)
FIGURE H (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
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A-to-B B-to-C
(Donative Transfer)
FIGURE I (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
In Figure I, the reduced “down” arrow under the A-to-B transaction
represents the diminished chilling effect that invalidating the restraint will
have on A-to-B donative transfers.  In Figure H, involving a non-donative
transfer, the chilling effect on A-to-B transfers is more pronounced, as rep-
resented by the larger down arrow under the A-to-B transfer.
Why does a rule invalidating restraints imposed within a donative
transfer have less of an effect on future A-to-B transfers than when the
restraint is imposed within a non-donative transfer?  This result becomes
obvious when one considers that most donative transfers involve a probate
transfer, at the donor’s death, by virtue of a will.  Striking down an aliena-
bility restraint in a will is not going to prohibit future will transfers.  Simply
put, in this context, the donor has no choice but to transfer his property.
If he does not do so by a will, the state will apply its intestate succession law
to accomplish this task for the donor.  The probate donor is in a bad—
indeed, the worst—of bargaining positions.  When a restraint imposed in a
non-donative transfer is stricken by a court, however, it is much more
likely that there will be a chilling effect on future transactions.  It is more
probable that a living grantee in a non-donative transfer might decide to
completely refrain from the transaction if he knows that his desired aliena-
bility restraint will not be enforced; a living grantee, as opposed to a pro-
bate donor, has this option.30
30. This analysis changes, of course, if the alienability restraint is imposed in a
non-probate (an inter vivos) donative transfer.  Here, at least, it is theoretically pos-
sible that the donative grantor might be inhibited if he knows that his desired
alienability restraint will not be enforced.  The extent to which someone contem-
plating an inter vivos gift of property might be chilled if he knows that his desired
alienability restraint will not be enforced is somewhat difficult to gauge.  In any
event, the Restatement does not distinguish between probate and non-probate do-
nors, probably because the number of non-probate donative transfers involving an
attempted alienability restraint is probably relatively small compared to the volume
of probate donative transfers involving an alienability restraint.  For this reason,
then, the justification for striking alienability restraints is sometimes articulated in
terms of a reluctance to permit “dead hand” control of property. See, e.g., Cast v.
Nat’l Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 176 N.W.2d 29, 39 (Neb. 1970) (“The
primary considerations underlying the prohibition against restraints on alienation
is that they are economically undesirable and that the dead hand should not be
allowed to control the living.”), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in part, 183
N.W.2d 485 (Neb. 1971); Korngold, supra note 15, at 1553–54 (equating law’s de-
sire to preserve alienability of property with aversion towards “dead hand con-
14
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To summarize, any time an alienation restraint is stricken, this posi-
tively affects alienation with regard to B-to-C transfers; striking the re-
straint, after all, allows B-to-C transactions to occur.  This result, however,
comes at the cost of chilling A-to-B transactions.  When A-to-B transactions
involve a donative transfer, however, the “costs” of striking the restraint
are less pronounced than when the restraint is imposed in a non-donative
transfer.  As such, courts are more likely to strike an alienation restraint
that is imposed within a donative transfer.31  The objective of aggregate
alienability necessitates this distinction within the law.32
trol”).  Even though the rules sticking restraints on alienability extends beyond
situations in which those restraints are imposed within a probate transfer, the fre-
quency with which this issue comes up in the probate context invites the equating
of the separate goals of preserving alienability and limiting “dead hand” control.
31. It is worth mentioning one potential exception to the general rule that
alienability restraints are more likely to be tolerated when imposed in a non-dona-
tive transfer.  This potential exception involves donative transfers to a charity.
Without question, courts are more likely to tolerate an alienability restraint if it is
imposed in a donative transfer to a charity rather than a donative transfer to a non-
charity. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 406 cmt. i (stating that restraint imposed
in transfer to charity is more likely to be enforceable); J.C. Vance, Validity and Effect
of Provision or Condition Against Alienation in Gift for Charitable Trust or to Charitable
Corporation, 100 A.L.R. 2d 1208 § 2 (1965) (“[A]n express provision or condition
against alienation in a gift to a charitable trust or to a charitable corporation is an
exception to the operation of the rule against restraints on alienation and consti-
tutes a valid restraint.”).  Whether this generous treatment of restraints on the
alienability of charities is strong enough that a restraint in a donative transfer to a
charity would be treated more favorable than a restraint imposed within a non-
donative transfer is not clear.  In any event, although donative transfers to charities
offer a potential exception to the distinction made in the text between donative
and non-donative transfers, the reason that restraints imposed in transfers to char-
ity are treated more favorably can still be understood in terms of the aggregate
alienability concept.  Because the law generally encourages donations to charities,
it is more tolerant of restraints imposed within the context of a charitable dona-
tion, because of the inhibitive effect that a contrary rule might have.  Here, aggre-
gate alienability can be understood to incorporate not just the amount or
frequency of transactions but the importance or nature of a particular transaction.
Cf. David M. Becker, A Methodology for Solving Perpetuities Problems Under the Common
Law Rule: A Step-By-Step Process That Carefully Identifies All Testing Lives in Being, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 949, 1026 n.239 (1989) (“A gift to a single charity may tie up the
subject matter indefinitely; despite this [technical violation of the rule against per-
petuities], such gift is upheld because of a policy strongly favoring and encourag-
ing charitable gifts.”).
32. Additional considerations support the less favorable treatment of aliena-
tion restraints imposed within donative transfers.  For one, the presence of a pay-
ing grantee ensures that the future costs of the restraint are taken into account
when the restriction is created.  In a non-donative transfer, the grantee that is buy-
ing the property interest is also the party who will be prohibited from alienating
the property in the future.  The grantee can anticipate this cost, but obviously
believes that the benefits of going forward with the transaction (in which the
grantee’s alienation rights are restrained) are worth it, even though the grantee
would obviously prefer to have full alienation rights.  The grantee performs a cost/
benefit analysis in deciding to go forward with the transaction, and the grantee’s
weighing process serves as a rough surrogate for the societal interests involved.
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B. Leases v. Non-Leases
The law regarding the validity of alienability restraints makes a sharp
distinction between restraints imposed within leases as compared to other
types of estates.  Restraints imposed on a tenant by a landlord are treated
much more favorably than restraints on non-lease estates;33 in fact, there
is a general presumption that a landlord’s alienability restraint will be en-
forced.34  Moreover, in some instances, a tenant is precluded from trans-
Moreover, there are straightforward fairness arguments in favor of enforcing a
restraint imposed within a non-donative transfer.  When a grantor and grantee
have entered into an arm’s length transaction that involves a restraint on alienabil-
ity, it can appear unfair to allow the grantee to be excused from the agreed-upon
restraint.  Presumably, the price that was paid to the grantor was discounted by the
purported restraint on the grantor’s ability to alienate the property.  To excuse the
grantee from the negotiated terms of the deal would grant the grantee a right that
is negated in the written document and that was presumably not paid for by the
grantee. See Alby v. Banc One Fin., 128 P.3d 81, 84 (Wash. 2006) (en banc)
(“[C]ourts should be reluctant to invoke common law principles disfavoring re-
straints to invalidate a bargained for contract freely agreed to by the parties.”).
This concern, however, obviously does not apply to donative transfers.  By striking
restraints on alienation that are imposed within a donative transfer, the court does
not permit the donee to acquire more rights than what was bargained for.
Granted, the donee is given more rights than what was described in the instrument
of conveyance, but the donee has not purchased these rights.  The donor is, per-
haps, frustrated that the gift involves more rights than what was intended to be
transferred; this frustration is materially different, however, from the grantor-seller
who accepted a discounted price because of the inclusion of a restraint on aliena-
bility, only to have this restraint invalided by the courts at a later time.
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (2000) (“Per-
missible restraints on alienation of leaseholds are often greater than on fee-simple
estates . . . .”).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS div. I, pt. II,
ch.4, introductory note (1983) (“Restraints on the alienation of tenants’ interest in
the landlord-tenant situation are widely used to give the landlord some additional
assurance that the tenant of his choice will stay on the land perform the obliga-
tions of the lease.  The validity of these restraints on the tenant is generally recog-
nized.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2)
(1977) (“A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the ten-
ant’s interest in the leased property is valid . . . .”).  It is common for leases to
include a restraint on a tenant’s right to alienate. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY
C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 586
(1st ed. 2012) (“[M]any leases, both residential and commercial, provide that a
tenant may not sublease or assign with the express consent of the landlord.”).
That the tenant’s power to transfer the lease depends upon the landlord’s consent
does not alter the characterization of the restriction as an alienability restraint be-
cause even a flat prohibition on alienation can be waived (that is, consented to) by
the grantor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. d (2000)
(“A prohibition on transfer of property without the consent of another is an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation unless there is a strong justification for the
prohibition . . . .”).
Some jurisdictions require that a landlord’s refusal to consent to a transfer of
a commercial lease be reasonable, unless the landlord’s right to refuse for any
reason is specifically reserved in the lease. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1995.010–1995.270 (West 2015) (articulating California rule); Kendall v. Ernest
Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (discussing same), superseded in statute, CAL
16
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ferring her interest in a lease by operation of law, that is, even without an
alienability restraint that is imposed by the grantor as part of the lease.35
At a surface level, it is relatively easy to see why restraints on a tenant’s
right to alienate are generally tolerated.36  A landlord-tenant relationship
is unique in that it will usually involve a continuing—and often personal—
relationship between the holder of the future interest (the landlord) and
the holder of the present interest (the tenant).  First, of course, is the
continuing obligation of the tenant to pay rent to the landlord.  A land-
lord has a vested interest in leasing only to tenants who can meet the rent
obligations under the lease and also in precluding transfers to people who
cannot meet this obligation.37  Conversely, a landlord has continuing obli-
gations to the tenant involving repairs of the leased premises.  Obviously,
landlords have a vested interest in controlling to whom this obligation is
CIV. CODE § 1995.270.  The Restatement adopts this “minority” position and ex-
tends it to residential leases as well. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LAND-
LORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2) (1977) (stating approach); id. § 15.2(1), reporter’s
note (acknowledging that Restatement position is “minority view”). But see id. illus.
8 (suggesting that landlord’s refusal to consent to transfer is more likely to be
reasonable in context of residential lease).  The California and Restatement ap-
proaches can be viewed as an outgrowth of the widely accepted view that a land-
lord has a duty to mitigate a tenant’s damages. JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION
TO PROPERTY 470–71 (2d ed. 2005) (noting modern mitigation requirement).  Be-
cause a landlord’s duty to mitigate usually requires that the landlord act reasona-
bly, a tenant who is “unreasonably” denied consent to transfer can essentially
effectuate this same result by formally surrendering to the landlord and presenting
the proposed transferee as a new tenant. See Kendall, 709 P.2d at 845 (noting how
mitigation requirement of landlord leads to requirement that denial of attempted
transfer be reasonable).  Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have refused to require
that a landlord’s rejection of a proposed transfer of the lease be reasonable while
simultaneously imposing a mitigation requirement on the landlord. See Vasquez v.
Carmel Shopping Ctr. Co., 777 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining Texas
law on these issues).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT §15.1 (1977)
(stating that tenants are usually entitled to alienate their interest (absent lease re-
straint on alienability), but providing exceptions); see also Joshua Stein, Assignment
and Subletting Restrictions in Leases and What They Mean in the Real World, 44 REAL
PROP. TRUST & ESTATE L.J. 1, 20 n.54 (2009) (listing states that preclude tenants
from alienating their interest unless consent to transfer is given by landlord, even
without lease provision requiring landlord’s consent).
36. See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 274 (3d ed. 1989) (“The reasons for such restrictions [on alienability in
a lease] are fairly apparent.”).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2)
cmt. a (1977) (“The landlord may have an understandable concern about certain
personal qualities of a tenant, particularly his reputation for meeting his financial
obligations.”).  Although a tenant remains personally liable on the lease even after
a transfer (absent a novation, see id. § 16.1 cmt. c (making clear continuing con-
tractual liability of original tenant absent “release” or “novation”)), a landlord
would always prefer that the tenant in possession timely pay the rent rather than
have to initiate a suit for recovery or ejection proceedings.  In this sense, then, the
landlord’s interest that the lease only be transferred to financially capable transfer-
ees can be viewed in terms of a practical interest in avoiding costly, time-consum-
ing, and potentially fruitless (if the original tenant is judgment proof) litigation.
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owed.  In addition, although the continuing relationship between all land-
lords and tenants is somewhat personal in nature, this aspect of the rela-
tionship can become even more pronounced with regard to leases
involving residential property.  Put simply, landlords will often be very
picky in deciding who gets to possess “their” residential property, and
rightly so.
The well-established rule that landlords can usually restrain the alien-
ation rights of their tenants is sometimes explained as an exception to the
common law’s general goal of preserving the alienability of property.38
The better explanation for this rule, however, is aggregate alienability.  Be-
cause many landlords might simply refuse to lease their property if they
could not control subsequent transfers of the leasehold interest, aggregate
alienability is achieved (paradoxically) by allowing the landlord to restrain
alienability.  Indeed, the landlord-tenant context is probably the best ex-
ample of why it is sometimes necessary to allow property to be restrained
in order to achieve aggregate alienability.
This result is best illustrated by returning to the depictions developed
in Section II.  Recall that a decision to invalidate an alienability restraint
has inverse effects on different types of transactions, as demonstrated in
Figure J.
A-to-B B-to-C
(A imposes restraint) (B seeks to avoid restraint)
FIGURE J (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
When the A-to-B transaction is a lease, however, the chilling effect on
A-to-B transactions is more pronounced.  Because of the continuing (and
personal) nature of the landlord-tenant relationship, many landlords
might choose to refrain from leasing their property if they know that they
cannot prevent subsequent transfers of the leasehold interest.  Thus, the
chilling effect on A-to-B transactions is more dramatic when the property
interest being restrained is a leasehold rather than a non-leasehold.
Stated differently, the cost of striking a restraint (so as to permit B-to-C
38. See, e.g., Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990) (conceding valid-
ity of alienability restraints when imposed within lease but discussing topic as if it is
exception, rather than in furtherance, of goal of free alienation of property).
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transactions) is much higher for leases than for non-leases.  This result is
depicted below in Figure K and Figure L.
A-to-B B-to-C
(Non-leasehold Interest)
FIGURE K (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
A-to-B B-to-C
(Leasehold Interest)
FIGURE L (RESTRAINT STRICKEN)
Because striking down an alienability restraint has disparate effects on
grantors considering the conveyance of a lease and grantors considering
the conveyance of another type of property interest, aggregate alienability
requires that these two situations be treated differently.  As such, restraints
imposed upon leaseholds are treated differently and are almost always
enforced.39
39. A lease will usually involve other factors that favor enforcement of the
restraint on alienability.  For instance, a lease almost always occurs as the result of a
non-donative transfer rather than a donative transfer. See generally supra Part
III(A).  Moreover, a lease usually involves a shorter possessory estate as opposed to
a longer possessory estate. See, e.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon
Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 P.2d 710, 719 (Cal. 1992) (noting that lease restraints exist only
for limited duration of lease). See generally infra Part III(C).  This overlap, however,
should not obscure the fundamental distinction between leases and other posses-
sory estates.  Even controlling for other variables, the continuing relationship re-
quired between landlord and tenant justifies the enforcement of restraints on
alienability under an aggregate alienability analysis.
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C. Longer Estates v. Shorter Estates
The type of estate on which the alienation restraint is imposed is a
factor that is considered in determining the validity of the restraint.  Gen-
erally speaking, a restraint is more likely to be upheld if it is imposed on a
shorter estate and more likely to be stricken if it is imposed on a longer
estate.40
This result can again be understood in terms of aggregate alienability.
Unlike the discussion in the previous subsections (involving donative
transfers and leases), however, here, the aggregate alienability analysis
turns on the dissimilar results in the B-to-C transaction.
Recall that the decision to uphold and enforce a restraint, like the
decision to invalidate a restraint, has inverse effects on different types of
transactions.  This result is depicted below in Figure M.
A-to-B B-to-C
(B seeks to avoid restraint)(A imposes restraint)
FIGURE M (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
Obviously, upholding a restraint precludes the B-to-C transaction and
all such similar types of transactions.  This effect is represented by the
down arrow under the B-to-C transaction.  However, the decision to up-
hold the restraint has an inverse effect on A-to-B transactions.  Because
parties like A know that their desired restraint will be upheld, they are not
discouraged from entering into A-to-B transactions.41
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (2000) (“Gen-
erally, greater restraints are justified on estates of lesser duration than on estates of
longer duration . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 4.2 (1983) (permitting forfeiture restraints on life estates but invalidating them
on fee simple estate); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 406, 409, 410 (1944) (im-
posing more lenient approach to validity of restraints on alienation of life estates
and term of years than restraints on alienation of fee simple estates); DWYER &
MENELL, supra note 7, at 185 (stating that restraints on fee simple estates are usu-
ally invalid, that restraints on life estates may be valid, and that restraints on “lesser
interests” are usually valid).
41. Of course, parties in the position of B would prefer that the law not up-
hold the restraint.  Thus, it is tempting to conclude that a decision to either invali-
date or uphold the restraint will have no net effect on the amount of A-to-B
transactions because under either legal rule (uphold or invalidate restraint) one
party will get the result he wants.  This line of thinking, we believe, is incorrect.
There is a difference between (1) a party like A wanting a restraint, but being
precluded from this option by a legal rule invalidating these types of restraints and
20
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When a restraint is imposed on an estate of a longer duration, how-
ever, the effect of enforcing the restraint is more pronounced; the prop-
erty is inalienable for a longer time period.  Conversely, when the restraint
is on a shorter estate, the cost of enforcing the restraint is reduced be-
cause the property is inalienable for a shorter period.  This result is de-
picted in Figure N and Figure O.
A-to-B B-to-C
(Restraint on Longer Estate)
FIGURE N (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
A-to-B B-to-C
(Restraint on Shorter Estate)
FIGURE O (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
The aggregate alienability calculus is different in each of these scena-
rios.  Because a greater number of potential transactions are foreclosed
when the restraint is imposed on a longer estate,42 the cost of enforcing
(2) a party like B desiring full alienation rights while A prefers restraints on B’s
alienation rights.  When the law invalidates a desired restraint on alienability, the
parties’ freedom to structure the parameters of the transaction as they desire (in-
cluding, of course, the price that B will pay to A) is inhibited.  If the law permits a
restraint, the parties might disagree on whether the restraint will be included in
the transaction, but they have the full range of options as to how to structure the
transaction. But cf. CALVIN MASSEY, PROPERTY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND
CASES 136 (2012) (“But who in his right mind would pay to acquire an estate this is
burdened with an absolute, or even very significant, restraint on alienation?”).  In-
validating a restraint, then, will result in fewer A-to-B transactions because the par-
ties’ freedom to structure the transaction is inhibited.  Upholding a restraint,
however, will result in more A-to-B transactions, because the parties’ freedom to
structure the deal is maximized, even though each party has a different interest as
to whether the restraint is included as part of the transaction.
42. Of course, there must be some mechanism for the transfer of a “long” in-
terest that survives the death of its holder; otherwise, a grantee’s interest would
technically remain the property of the deceased.  Thus, even a valid alienability
restraint is not thought to preclude the interest from passing to the heirs of the
deceased. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 illus. 1
(1983) (implying that even most “comprehensive as possible” alienability restraint
21
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this restraint is higher.  It is no surprise, then, that the law is more likely to
invalidate the restraint that is imposed on a longer estate.  Conversely, the
cost of enforcing a restraint that is imposed on a shorter estate is smaller.
The law, predictably, is more likely to enforce this type of restraint.  Aggre-
gate alienability compels this distinction.43
must allow for transfer by intestate succession).  In this way, at least, the interest
will always be owned by a living person.
That an alienability restraint, even if valid, can never preclude an intestate
transfer does not, however, change the conclusion that a restraint is more likely to
be invalid if imposed on a longer estate.  Thus, for instance, if a fee simple interest
is impaired from both inter vivos alienation and testamentary alienation, and that
restraint is enforceable, the interest is forever precluded from transfer except by
decent to heirs.  This situation would somewhat resemble the “fee tail” estate,
which has been rejected in almost all American jurisdictions.  See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1015, 1049–50 (2008) (explaining fee tail estate and its abolition by almost all
American jurisdictions).  On the other hand, a valid alienability restraint (both
inter vivos and testamentary) of a shorter possessory estate does not preclude aliena-
tion forever; once that estate is extinguished (and this could conceivably be after
the estate has passed by intestate succession, such as with a long term of years), the
property would then become freely alienable again (assuming that no alienability
restraint is imposed on the succeeding estate).
In any event, an alienability restraint clause will often be interpreted as the
grantor’s attempt to restrict only inter vivos transfers and not testamentary transfers
via a will. See, e.g., Merrill I. Schnebly, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests:
II, 44 YALE L.J. 1186, 1195 n.188 (1935) (“In a large number of the decisions hold-
ing restraints void, the language employed in the restraints did not expressly pro-
hibit alienation by way of devise . . . .”).  The primary problem with alienability
restraints is that they prohibit inter vivos transfers, not that they require that the
property pass upon death to the deceased’s heirs rather than the deceased’s devi-
sees. See id. at 1195 (“It is the power of inter vivos transfer which is practically
important [to the law governing the validity of restraints on alienation].”). But see
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406 illus. 5 (1944) (holding that restraints pre-
cluding only testamentary alienation of fee simple, and not inter vivos alienation, is
invalid).  After all, a grantor can validly preclude a grantee from any probate trans-
fer at the grantee’s death by limiting the duration of the grantee’s estate, such as
by creating a life estate in the grantee.  For this reason, a discussion of the law of
alienability restraints will often focus exclusively on inter vivos transactions and ig-
nore testamentary transactions. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVI-
TUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (2000) (stating that discussion includes “prohibitions on some
or all types of transfers,” but then mentioning only inter vivos transactions).
43. This analysis assumes that grantors contemplating the imposition of re-
straints on different types of estates will react similarly to a rule invalidating the
restraints.  If only the B-to-C transaction is considered (as in the text), the costs (in
terms of the goal of maximum alienability of property) of enforcing a restraint on
a fee simple are necessarily higher than the costs of enforcing a restraint on a
shorter estate like a life estate, because the prohibition on the B-to-C transfer exists
for a longer time period when it is imposed on a fee simple.  It is theoretically
possibly, however, that grantors of fee simples and life estates might react differ-
ently to a rule that invalidates the grantors’ desired restraint.  Thus, it is possible
that grantors might continue to grant fee simple estates, even though they wish to
restrain the alienability of that estate and even though they know that this desired
restraint will not be enforced, while grantors of life estates will refuse to make
conveyances of life estates unless they know the desired alienability restraint will be
enforced.  By considering this variable, the analysis as to whether to enforce a re-
straint on a life estate as compared to a fee simple becomes much more compli-
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D. Disabling Restraints v. Promissory/Forfeiture Restraints
The law governing the validity of alienability restraints has consist-
ently maintained a sharp distinction as to the type of restraint involved.
Three general categories of restraints have been recognized: disabling re-
straints, forfeiture restraints, and promissory restraints.44  The difference
between these three different types of restraints goes towards the repercus-
sions that follow from a violation of the respective restraint.  A disabling
restraint is a restraint that purports to flatly prohibit or invalidate any sub-
sequent transfer of the property.45  A forfeiture restraint also restricts
alienability but provides for a different remedy in the event of alienation:
the interest is forfeited to either the original grantor (the person imposing
the forfeiture restraint) or a third party.46  A promissory restraint is con-
ceptually different than the other two restraints in that its analytical foun-
dations are rooted in contract law rather than property law.  Under a
promissory restraint, the grantee makes a promise that alienation will not
occur.47  If this promise is broken, the promisor-grantee is liable in con-
cated, because the effect of each alternative (enforce or strike down the restraint)
must be considered with regard to the empirical effect of both the B-to-C transac-
tion and the A-to-B transaction, from the perspective of each estate.  Nevertheless,
the law seems to avoid this complexity by assuming that the grantors of each estate
are just as likely to be chilled or encouraged by a law that either strikes down
restraints or enforces them.  The widely accepted black-letter law that restraints on
greater estates are more likely to be stricken than restraints on lesser estates seems
to assume that grantors in the A-to-B transaction will react similarly regardless of
the type of estate being restrained.  Although it is an empirical question that is
probably almost impossible to test, it is the authors’ opinion that the assumption
on which the black-letter law seems to be based is almost surely accurate.
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.1–3.3
(1983); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 404 (1944) (making this distinction).
The Third Restatement eschews this distinction in favor of an all-encompassing
balancing test of “reasonableness.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 3.4 (1983).  Courts, however, continue to distinguish between disabling, forfei-
ture, and promissory restraints when determining the validity of an alienability
restraint. See, e.g., Alby v. Banc One Fin., 128 P.3d 81, 86–87 (Wash. 2006) (en
banc) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (recognizing this distinction in context of deter-
mining validity of ability restraint); Vande Guchte v. Kort, 703 N.W.2d 611, 620–21
(Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (same).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 404 (1944) (defining disabling restraint).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 404 (defining forfeiture restraint).  If the interest
terminates in favor of the grantor, assuming the forfeiture restraint is valid, the
grantee has an interest that is either determinable or subject to a condition subse-
quent.  If the interest terminates in favor of a third party, and assuming the forfei-
ture restraint is valid, the grantee has an interest that is subject to an executory
limitation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. b
(1983) (using “special limitation” instead of determinable, but stating similar
concept).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 404 (1944) (defining promissory restraint).
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tract damages to the promisee-grantor, but the transaction in violation of
the promise is not effected.48
The law governing the validity of these types of restraints is nuanced,
but it is accurate to make the general observation that disabling restraints
are usually invalid and that forfeiture and promissory restraints are more
likely to be upheld than disabling restraints.49  This result can again be
understood in terms of aggregate alienability.  Here, again, as with the
distinction between longer and shorter estates, the inquiry involves what
we have labeled as the B-to-C transaction.  Because disabling restraints, by
completely withholding from the grantee the power of alienation, com-
pletely foreclose the possibility of alienation by the grantee, enforcing
them comes at a greater cost in terms of the B-to-C transactions that are
precluded.50
48. This straightforward conclusion is muddled somewhat by the fact that
contractual remedies can sometimes include specific performance in equity, and
that courts have occasionally enforced promissory restraints by an injunction pre-
cluding the promisor from alienating the property.  When this occurs, a promis-
sory restraint functions in a manner similar to a disabling restraint. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.2 cmt. a (1983) (ex-
plaining that specific performance might be used to enforce promissory restraints
and similarity in effect to disabling restraints).
49. The First Restatement is unequivocal in invalidating disabling restraints,
while the Second Restatement is (slightly) more tolerant. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF PROP. § 406(a) (1944) (stating that alienability restraint is only valid if it is for-
feiture or promissory restraint); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 (1983) (stating that disabling restraint is invalid if, by its terms, it
makes alienation impossible, but providing that disabling restraints that provide
process whereby alienation is possible (such as receiving consent of third party)
can be valid in some circumstances); id. §§ 4.2–4.3 (providing balancing test to
determine validity of forfeiture or promissory restraint).
50. When the grantee has no power to alienate, the interest held by the
grantee passes to his or her heirs upon the grantee’s death (assuming that the
interest does not extinguish upon the grantee’s death, such as with a life estate).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 illus. 1 (implying
that even most “comprehensive as possible” alienability restraint must allow for
transfer by intestate succession).  The interest received by the heirs would still be
impaired by the disabling restraint against alienation if the law did not invalidate
this type of restraint.  A disabling restraint, then, “freezes” alienation for the dura-
tion of the estate.
There are some additional prickly issues that can arise under a disabling re-
straint.  The conceptual basis for a disabling restraint is that the grantor has com-
pletely withheld the right to alienate.  Using the familiar “bundle of rights”
analogy, under a disabling restraint a grantor has granted the full bundle of rights
but withheld the right to alienate.  When a grantee nevertheless alienates, and
litigation ensues, a court must grapple with some difficult conceptual issues.  In
one type of case, the grantee seeks to take advantage of the disabling restraint by
denying the validity of a subsequent transfer. See, e.g., Bouldin v. Miller, 28 S.W.
940 (Tex. 1894) (considering suit by party that had sold in violation of disabling
restraint and was attempting to invalidate that transaction).  Thus, if O conveys to
A with a disabling restraint, and A then conveys to B, A will take the position in a
dispute with B that no conveyance occurred because A did not have the power to
alienate.  To allow A to benefit from the disabling restraint becomes particularly
problematic when one considers that B might be a creditor attempting to force a
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 25 15-DEC-15 12:21
2015] AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY 1037
With a forfeiture or promissory restraint, however, the validity of the
restraint does not completely preclude subsequent transfers of the prop-
erty.51  When a grantee transfers in contradiction of a promissory re-
straint, the transfer is effective to convey the property interest, even
though the transferor might be liable to the original grantor for contrac-
tual damages.  Obviously, the potential existence of these contractual rem-
edies might tend to inhibit the grantee from transferring in violation of
the promissory restraint, but this inhibition is different in kind than the
absolute prohibition on transfers that would occur if a disabling restraint
was enforceable.  Similarly, a forfeiture restraint does not completely fore-
stall subsequent transfers of the restrained property.  Granted, a forfeiture
restraint will not usually allow the grantee to transfer to a person of his or
her choosing, as an attempted transfer causes the interest to be for-
feited.52  That said, a grantee who truly wishes to disavow themself of the
sale of A’s interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 4.1 cmt. a (1983) (“Disabling restraints are especially objectionable because, if
effective, they enable the person restrained to deny the validity of such person’s
own transfer, whether voluntary or involuntary.”).  In another type of case, the
grantee alienates in violation of the disabling restraint, and it is the initial grantor
who initiates litigation seeking to invalidate the transaction. See, e.g., Pond Creek
Coal Co. v. Runyan, 170 S.W. 501, 501–03 (Ky. 1914) (involving suit by original
grantor when disabling alienability restraint was violated), overruled in part by Ken-
tland Coal & Coke. Co. v. Keen, 183 S.W. 247 (Ky. 1916); Shields v. Moffitt, 683
P.2d 530, 534 (Okla. 1984) (same).  It is somewhat difficult to conceptualize the
basis of the grantor’s damages and remedy in this situation.  The grantor does not
have a valid, present possessory interest in the land; this right was transferred to
the grantee and has not been forfeited back to the grantor.  Essentially, the gran-
tor’s suit, if asserted against the transferee, is seeking to restore or confirm the
valid legal title in the grantee.  The absence of a clear remedy or injury to the
grantor in this type of suited has been noted by courts as a reason to invalidate
disabling restraints. See Lohmann v. Adams, 540 P.2d 552, 556 (Okla. 1975) (“As a
result disabling restraint provisions have been held void because there remains no
one who has any beneficial interest in their enforcement which is not the case with
forfeiture restraints.”); Bouldin, 28 S.W. at 942  (“[W]hen there is no condition
annexed to said estate. . . .  [t]he first grantor could not complain because there
would be no condition broken, and therefore no right of reentry in him; and the
second grantor could not complain, because he would be estopped by his own
conveyance.  Thus, it appears that unlimited power of alienation exists in such
cases . . . .”).  Most often, it is the original grantee that comes to court asking for a
declaration that the disabling restraint is invalid. See, e.g., Riste v. E. Wash. Bible
Camp, Inc., 605 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (involving suit by grantee seek-
ing declaration that disabling restraint was invalid), superseded in statute, Garn–St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1983).  In these situa-
tions, the court can stave off the difficult remedy issues discussed above by ac-
cepting the grantee’s request to have the disabling restraint declared void.
51. See Real Property—Direct Disabling Restraints on Alienation Annexed to Legal
Life Estates, 41 TENN. L. REV. 364, 365 (1974) (“[Forfeiture and promissory re-
straints] fare quite well in the courts and are most often upheld, since they do not
substantially impair alienation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
52. The “usually” qualifier is necessary here because, in some instances, the
forfeiture result is contingent upon the grantor enforcing that remedy, such as
when the grantor retains a right of entry that must be exercised before it becomes
possessory.  This type of forfeiture provision is frequently used in leases because it
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property can accomplish this result by attempting to alienate, resulting in
a transfer to the party designated in the forfeiture restraint.53  Thus, un-
like with a disabling restraint, the property is not forever “frozen” by a
forfeiture restraint; a party who wishes to rid herself of property ownership
can accomplish this objective under a forfeiture restraint (and a promis-
sory restraint), but that party cannot do so under a disabling restraint.54
gives the landlord the option to either consent to the transfer (by doing nothing)
or to exercise the right of entry, thus resulting in a forfeiture of all interests of the
initial grantee and the transferee. See 10 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 77.01 n.6 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007)
(noting that leases often include forfeiture alienability restraint that may be en-
forced at option of initial grantor-landlord).  In this sense, then, it is theoretically
possible that a grantee might be able to alienate to a party of her choosing, despite
the existence of a forfeiture provision, if the grantee proceeds with the transfer
and the grantor fails to enforce the forfeiture provision. Cf. William G. Coskran,
Assignment and Sublease Restrictions: The Tribulations of Leasehold Transfers, 22 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 405, 487–94 (1989) (discussing California cases in which landlord
elects not to pursue forfeiture, although most of cases discussed involved promis-
sory restraint as opposed to forfeiture restraint).
53. Concededly, in most instances, a grantee will not be interested in transfer-
ring her interest just so that it will be forfeited to another party. Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.2 cmt. a (1983) (“A person is even
less likely to make a transfer in violation of a forfeiture restraint and thereby risk
losing his interest entirely than he is to make a transfer in violation of a disabling
restraint, since the result in the latter case [assuming the disabling restraint is en-
forced] is not the loss of his interest.”).  The point in this section, however, is that a
forfeiture restraint makes it possible for a transferee to part with his interest.  As it
turns out, there are some instances in which a grantee might wish to rid themself of
the burden associated with property ownership.  This situation can arise when the
grantee is a lessee who is obligated to perform various functions under the lease,
such as the payment of rent.  In this instance, the grantee-lessee might wish to
effectuate a transfer of the interest so as to relieve themself of the lease obligations,
regardless to whom the property is transferred.
54. Some commentators have argued that a forfeiture restraint encourages
the payment of debts by the grantee because of the risk of forfeiture due to an
attempted involuntary alienation by a creditor. See 6 A. JAMES CASNER, AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.50, at 487 (1952) (“While a forfeiture [restraint] in some
instances may disappoint the expectation of creditors unaware of the restraint,
usually the risk of loss of the property will suffice to induce the [grantee] to pay his
debt if possible.”).  This assumes, of course, that a creditor would proceed with
involuntary alienation proceedings that would not benefit the creditor, or that a
grantee would pay his underlying debts so as not to be at the mercy of a creditor
motivated solely by spite.  Theoretically, a creditor in this position could use the
threat of forfeiture to induce payment, although the grantee could call the credi-
tor’s bluff by inviting the creditor to initiate proceedings that will be of no use to
the creditor.  There is very little literature addressed to this aspect of a forfeiture
restraint. Cf. Schnebly, supra note 42, at 977 (noting that, from perspective of
creditors, forfeiture restraints function like disabling restraints in that it precludes
transfer to creditor); see also Ronald H. Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 670
(1988) (describing similar “blackmail” situation in land-use context); cf. The Scor-
pion and the Frog, Aesop’s Fables, AESOP’S FABLES http://www.aesopfables.com/cgi/
aesop1.cgi?4&TheScorpionandtheFrog [http://perma.cc/33Q5-FU7V] (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2015) (telling fable of scorpion and frog).
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Because disabling restraints completely foreclose subsequent transfers
of the restrained estate, while promissory and forfeiture restraints provide
at least some mechanism for the transfer of the estate by the grantee, the
concept of aggregate alienability requires that these different types of re-
straints be treated differently.  With regard to the B-to-C transaction, the
costs of enforcing a disabling restraint are higher than the costs of enforc-
ing a promissory or forfeiture restraint.55  This result is depicted below in
Figures P and Q.
A-to-B B-to-C
(Disabling Restraint)
FIGURE P (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
A-to-B B-to-C
(Forfeiture/Promissory Restraint)
FIGURE Q (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
Because of the more significant costs involved with enforcing a disa-
bling restraint, aggregate alienability requires that these restraints be
stricken more often than forfeiture and promissory restraints.  This is pre-
cisely the result under the well-established black letter law in this area.
E. Absolute Restraints v. Partial Restraints
The law regarding the validity of restraints on alienability has long
distinguished between absolute restraints and partial restraints.56  An ab-
55. Here again, the law presumes that the empirical effect on future A-to-B
transactions, of a law that either enforces or invalidates an alienability restraint,
will be the same for disabling restraints as compared to promissory or forfeiture
restraints.  See supra note 43.
56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406(b) (1944) (stating that cer-
tain types of restraint are valid only if “the restraint is qualified so as to permit
alienation to some though not all possible alienees”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (2000) (stating that “nature, extent, and duration of
the restraint are important considerations” in to determine validity of restraint).
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solute restraint precludes all alienation,57 while a partial restraint prohib-
its only certain types of alienation.58  A partial restraint might prohibit
alienation for only a certain time period, or to only a certain group of
people, or prohibit only inter vivos transfers.59
The law regarding the distinction between absolute and partial re-
straints is clear: a partial restraint is more likely to be upheld than is an
absolute restraint.60  Here, again, the distinction drawn within the black-
letter law can be understood in terms of aggregate alienability.  The analy-
sis here is very similar to that involving the duration of the estate (Subsec-
tion C) and the type of restraint (Subsection D); once again, the
distinction drawn by the law has to do with the B-to-C transaction.  An
absolute restraint on alienation completely prohibits all B-to-C transfers;
thus, the costs associated with enforcing this restraint are high.  However,
with a partial restraint on alienation, certain types of B-to-C transfers can
occur, even if the restraint is enforced.  Thus, for instance, if the partial
restraint prohibits only conveyances to a small group of people, the bene-
fits of enforcing the restraint (encouraging future A-to-B transfers that will
only be made if the restraint is enforceable) are achieved at the relatively
smaller cost of a partial impairment of B-to-C transfers.61  This result is
again depicted in Figures R and S below.
57. The distinction between absolute and partial restraints should not be con-
fused with the difference between disabling restraints and forfeiture/promissory
restraints.  The distinction between absolute and partial restraints has to do with
the breadth of transactions that the grantor wishes to preclude.  The distinction
between disabling restraints and promissory/forfeiture restraints has to do with
the remedy that follows from a violation of the grantor’s restraint.  Thus, one
might have an absolute forfeiture restraint (“Blackacre is not to be sold, and if so,
then to Willie”), or a partial disabling restraint (“Grantee has no power to sell to
Cornhuskers, said right being retained by the Grantor”), or any other combination
of the two distinct sets.
58. See Alfred L. Brophy & Shubha Ghosh, Whistling Dixie: The Invalidity and
Unconstitutionality of Covenants Against Yankees, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 57, 61–62
(1999) (distinguishing between absolute and partial restraints on alienation).
59. See id. (discussing different types of partial restraints on alienation); see
also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE,
AND CONSERVATION 625 (1st ed. 2006) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (2000) (same); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406, cmts.
e–m (1944) (same).
60. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 535 (stating that absolute restraints
on alienation are likely to be stricken but that partial restraints are valid if reasona-
ble); Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1815 n.192 (1996) (stating that absolute alienability re-
straints are more likely to be stricken than partial restraints on alienation).
61. The law here again assumes that future grantors desiring either a partial
or absolute restraint will react similarly to a rule of either validity or invalidity. See
supra notes 43 & 55.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 29 15-DEC-15 12:21
2015] AGGREGATE ALIENABILITY 1041
A-to-B B-to-C
(Absolute Restraint)
FIGURE R (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
A-to-B B-to-C
(Partial Restraint)
FIGURE S (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
Aggregate alienability requires that absolute restraints be treated less
favorably than partial restraints because enforcing absolute restraints has a
more dramatic effect on B-to-C transfers than do partial restraints.  This is
the result under the common law.62
62. This analysis can also be used to explain the distinction made between
direct and indirect restraints on alienability.  This Article considers only direct
alienability restraints, which, by their terms, prohibit some or all types of transfers.
See Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael Organ, Promising to be Prudent: A
Private Law Approach to Mortgage Loan Regulation in Common-Interest Communities, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 739, 764 (2012) (“A direct restraint is one that prohibits some
type of transfer . . . .”).  Direct restraints should be compared with indirect re-
straints, which impose restrictions on the grantees’ use of the land or provide for
the loss of the grantee’s interest should a contingency occur. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (2000) (defining indirect alienability
restraints).  Indirect restraints are more likely to be enforced than are direct re-
straints. Compare id. § 3.4 (imposing a “reasonableness” requirement on direct re-
straints), with id. § 3.5 (upholding indirect alienability restraints so long as they are
“rational”).  This can be understood by comparing the likelihood that a direct
alienability restraint, as compared to an indirect restraint, will foreclose future
transactions (Transaction #2). See id. § 3.5 cmt. a (“Unlike direct restraints on
alienation, which directly interfere with the process of conveying land . . . indirect
restraints may have no overall negative effects . . . .”).  Of course, in some in-
stances, an indirect restraint can be written in such a manner as to have the same
practical effect of a direct restraint, in foreclosing any transfer. See, e.g., Mountain
Brow Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816
(Ct. App. 1967) (considering validity of conveyance that prevented any party other
than grantor from using subject property).  Here, though, administrative concerns
often compel a court to ignore the practical effect of a draconian “use” restriction
and instead to maintain the clearer distinction between direct and indirect aliena-
bility restraints. See id. at 25–26 (discussing administrative difficulty of distinguish-
ing between permissible and impermissible indirect restraints); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5 cmt. a (2000) (“[C]ourts should
29
Meier and Ryan: Aggregate Alienability
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-5\VLR505.txt unknown Seq: 30 15-DEC-15 12:21
1042 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 1013
F. Legal Interests v. Equitable Interests
The final major distinction made regarding the legality of restraints
on alienability is that between legal interests and equitable interests.
When a settlor creates a trust, he has divided the legal and equitable inter-
ests of the property that is placed in the trust.  The legal interest (corpus)
is owned by the trustee.  This asset is managed for the benefit of the bene-
ficiary.  The equitable interest owned by the beneficiary usually constitutes
the income from the corpus or principal; when the trust consists of real
property, the equitable interest owned by the beneficiary includes the
right to use and enjoy the subject property.63
The law is much more tolerant of a settlor’s attempt to restrain the
alienability of the beneficiary’s equitable interest compared to a settlor’s
attempt to restrain the alienability of the trustee’s legal interest.64  Histori-
cal reasons dating all the way back to the distinction between law and eq-
uity partly explain this distinction,65 which has been subject to severe
criticism by some.66  Despite the complexity of the issue, it is accurate to
not attempt to weigh the harm caused by an indirect restraint against the overall
value of the transaction in which the [indirect restraint] played a part.”).
63. See generally Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in
Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 290–91 (2002) (describing basic concepts and termi-
nology associated with trusts).
64. See Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (approving, in
famous case, “spendthrift trust” in which settlor restrained alienability of benefi-
ciaries’ equitable interest); John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protec-
tion: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 166
n.18 (2004) (describing favorable treatment afforded to grantor’s alienability re-
straint on trust beneficiary’s equitable interest).  In fact, a court will often con-
clude that certain types of trusts preclude assignment of the equitable interest by
the beneficiary, even without a specific provision in the trust document to this
effect. See Monday v. Vance, 49 S.W. 516, 518 (Tex. 1899) (“The very purpose of
the deed in question was to provide a permanent support for the wife and children
and the means of educating the latter.  To permit an alienation of the interest of
the beneficiaries is destructive of the trust and incompatible with its purposes.  In
such cases the authorities hold that there is no power of alienation, although no
restrictions upon the power are expressed in the conveyance.”); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 cmt. b (1959) (“In a trust for support it is the
nature of the beneficiary’s interest rather than a provision forbidding alienation
which prevents the transfer of the beneficiary’s interest.  The rule stated in this
Section is not dependent upon a prohibition of alienation by the settlor . . . .”); id.
§ 155 cmt. b (“In a discretionary trust it is the nature of the beneficiary’s interest
rather than a provision forbidding alienation which prevents the transfer of the
beneficiary’s interest.  The rule stated in this Section is not dependent upon a
prohibition of alienation by the settlor . . . .”).
65. For a superb discussion of the history of the American position tolerating
restraints on equitable interests, see generally Alexander, supra note 14, at
1189–1266 (tracing several historical trends in analytical foundations and justifica-
tions for law involving restraints on alienability).
66. These criticisms were most famously asserted by renowned scholar John
Chipman Gray. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, Preface to the Second Edition, RESTRAINTS ON
THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY v–xii (2d ed. 1895) (offering spirited critique of
then-developing rules that permitted restraints on alienability of equitable
interests).
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state the general proposition that the law is much more tolerant of re-
straints on an equitable interest than restraints on a legal interest.
This result can, again, be explained pursuant to aggregate alienabil-
ity.  When a restraint is imposed only upon an equitable interest, the trus-
tee is nevertheless free to sell the legal interest in the property to a third
party, thus changing the corpus or principal to which the beneficiary
holds the equitable interest.67  In this way, then, society’s goal of allowing
property to transfer on the market to the highest and best user is achieved.
The cost of enforcing a restraint on alienability is much more dramatic
when the restraint is imposed on a legal interest rather than an equitable
interest.  As such, the concept of aggregate alienability compels the law to
be more tolerant of restraints on equitable interests.  This result is de-
picted below.
A-to-B B-to-C
(Restraint on Legal Interest)
FIGURE T (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
A-to-B B-to-C
(Restraint on Equitable Interest)
FIGURE U (RESTRAINT ENFORCED)
IV. CONCLUSION
The objective of this Article is not to suggest that the common law of
alienability restraints is the product of judges performing the detailed em-
pirical calculations suggested by the explanation of aggregate alienability
herein.  Rather, our thesis is that judges have been guided by a rough
sense of how particular rules might affect aggregate alienability.  As a re-
67. See Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 116–17 (2013) (describing how trust’s split between legal
and equitable title, and trustee’s power to sell legal interest, resolves many of the
policy concerns regarding alienability of property).
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sult of these rough estimates, a complex body of common law rules has
developed over time.  Applying this law to new disputes requires that the
analytical foundations of this body of law be properly understood.
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss5/5
